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The unravelling of the Middle East peace process continues to baffle the 
pundits. The early optimism of the Oslo peace accords has now turned into 
despair. Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish extremist. The 
Palestinians have embarked on a new Intifada. Israel has re-occupied much 
of the West Bank. What brought this reversal? How deep are the fractures? 
Can they be healed? 
Most of those writing on the issue reiterates the language of Huntington's 
"clash of civilisations." What we see in the Middle East, they tell us, is just 
another manifestation of "Jihad vs. McDonald's." It is the same old story of 
"religious fundamentalism" against "the market," of "xenophobic 
nationalism" against "neoliberalism," of the "third world against the "first 
world." There is perhaps some truth to these generalisations. 
The idea of a third-world "backlash" against neoliberal globalisation is 
certainly easy to understand. For most people in the so-called "South - 
including the Palestinians - the last decade has brought greater insecurity, 
deprivation and hopelessness, so their resentfulness could hardly be surprising. 
What seems less clear is the sudden bellicosity of "Northern" governments, 
particularly those of the US and the UK. Over the past decade, these 
governments have tirelessly glorified the "global village." What the world 
needed, they said, was open borders, free trade and capital mobility. So why 
the sudden shift to "with-us-or-against-us" patriotism? Do they really expect 
"war on terrorism" to bring global security? Are rising military budgets and 
cascading attacks against less developed countries the best way to turn the 
poor and hungry into "free market" acolytes? If the purpose is peace and 
stability, why not force Israel to comply with UN resolutions and let the 
Palestinians finally have their state? Is letting Ariel Sharon smash his way 
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back into West Bank a better recipe - or perhaps peace and stability aren't 
really the goals in this saga? What type of world order do Bush, Blair and 
Sharon have in mind, and who stand to gain from this "order"? 
From "war profits" to "peace dividends" 
On the surface, these are matters of "foreign policy." But there is a much 
deeper and often ignored layer here, related to fundamental shifts in the nature 
of capital accumulation, ownership and intra-capitalist conflict. 
In order to understand this broader picture, we need to go back a bit in history. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, global accumulation was dominated by 
an uneasy "Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition," made up of large oil 
companies, armament contractors and OPEC, and backed by the US and 
several European governments which supplied arms and encouraged high oil 
prices. The central accumulation "mechanism" of this coalition was the 
ongoing cycle of Middle East "energy conflicts" and "oil crisis." The logic 
of the process was relatively simple. Rising petroleum prices brought massive 
profits for the oil companies. They also generated huge petrodollar revenues 
for local OPEC governments, who were only too eager to spend them on 
expensive weaponry in preparation for the next war. As a result, the Middle 
East became the world's largest market for imported arms, absorbing over 11 
3rd of the total. The big arms contractors of course loved this arrangement, 
and the various US administrations - from Nixon's to Bush Sr.'s - supported 
it with equal zeal. Indeed, what better way to fight communism, divide and 
rule the Middle East, and enrich your corporate friends - all in one stroke 
and without investing a penny? 
The consequences of this process were nothing short of dramatic. Rising oil 
prices threw much of the world into a deep 'stagflationary' crisis (stag-nation 
combined with inflation), conflict bloomed everywhere and there was even 
the occasional flirt with nuclear exchange. The Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
Coalition, however, thrived. As Figure 1 shows, oil and armament companies 
became the world's most profitable firms, seeing their earnings rise to 19% 
of the world total after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and to 21% after the 1980 
onset of the Iran-Iraq war. "War profits" were clearly the way to go. [See 
figure 1 ] 
All of this changed in the 1990s. The cold war ended, the world opened up 
for business and the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition disintegrated. In its 
place, a different "Technodollar-Mergerdollar Alliance," based on civilian 
high-tech and corporate takeover rose to prominence. Instead of "war profits," 
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nationalism and conflict, it marshalled a new rhetoric of "peace dividends," 
foreign investment and emerging markets. Capital controls gave way to 
deregulation, protectionism to privatisation and bloody wars to peace deals. 
And indeed, by end of 2000, the Technodollar-Mergerdollar Alliance seemed 
victorious. As Figure 1 illustrates, its global profit share soared to 15%, while 
that of the oil and armament companies sank to a meagre 3%. 
Israeli capitalism goes global 
Israel's U-turn of the 1990s, from a welfare-warfare state to liberalism and 
regional reconciliation, is part of this global shift. Until the late 1980s, private 
business and national security went hand in hand. Israel served the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition by engaging in seasonal wars and various 
clandestine operations, this in return for massive US military assistance, a 
tacit acceptance of Israel's nuclear build-up and a license to run a closed war 
economy. During the mid-1970s, Israel's military expenditure soared to 33% 
of GDP - with roughly 15% imported from U.S. and the remaining 18% 
spent locally. The large local firms lunched at the military procurement table 
while benefiting handsomely from the resulting inflation which ravaged much 
of the economy, but fuelled the stock market which they helped rig. The 
social cohesion necessary for sustaining this war economy was cemented by 
welfare spending, Zionist nationalism and frequent armed conflict. The 
Palestinians provided the cheap labour force in this equation and were pacified 
by a combination of relatively higher standards of living and a large dose of 
force. 
By the early 1990s, though, the arithmetic changed. Following George Bush's 
announcement of a "new world order," Israeli military spending came under 
the axe falling to 10% of GDP by the mid-1990s, weapon exports went into a 
tailspin and pressures to open up the domestic economy mounted. To 
complicate things further, the Palestinians revolted and the mounting cost of 
squelching their Intifada now seemed huge compared with rapidly vanishing 
war profits. It was clearly time to shift gears. The loss-making welfare-warfare 
state was ceremonially dumped, replaced by the new and more lucrative 
alternative of transnational neoliberalism. 
The political front window of the process was of course the Oslo peace 
accords, but there was more here than meets the eye. Normalising relations 
with the Palestinians paved the way to peace agreements with other Arab 
countries. These agreements brought an end to the Arab boycott and with 
conflict quickly receding, Israel was able to remove capital controls - the 
main barrier to globalisation. During the earlier period of strife, capital controls 
were necessary to prevent capital from flying out of the country en masse. 
When conflict receded, these controls could be removed, the currency floated 
and the globalisation of ownership begin in earnest. 
And sure enough, within a few years the local business elite has shifted its 
attention outside the country, increasingly aligning itself with and integrating 
into an emerging transnational business class. The evidence of this integration 
is overwhelming. Foreign institutional investors now own 10-15% of the 
Tel-Aviv stock market. Many of the country's largest corporations have been 
taken over by non-resident "Israelis" - such as the Arison family of Carnival 
Cruise who bought the leading Bank Hapoalim and the Bronfman family of 
Vivendi-Seagrarn, who control the conglomerate Koor. 
Most of Israel's leading high-tech firms, such as Comverse, Check Point, 
Amdocs and Teva, are Israeli mostly by name, having their shares listed in 
New York and much of their activity carried outside the country. The vast 
majority of the country's start-up companies have been driven by "inverted 
cannibalism," desperately looking for a global giant to take them over. Indeed, 
the whole outlook of the Israeli business sector is pointing overseas. Until 
the late 1980s this was mostly reflected in rising exports which have recently 
reached 113 of GDP, but since the early 1990s capital too has began moving 
out, with outflowing investment accounting for roughly 1-2% of GDP and 
growing. 
The results of this transnationalisation are evident in Figure 2, which charts 
the increasing correlation between the Tel-Aviv stock market and the Nasdaq. 
Over the past five years this correlation has reached 0.8, up from a negative 
0.3 in the early 1980s. This suggests that 80% of "Israeli" accumulation 
depends not on what happens locally but in the global high-tech market. 
Israeli capitalists have finally realised their American dream of a 'New Middle 
East:' local by denomination, global by accumulation. [See figure 2 on next 
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Abandoning the domestic population 
And yet, this transition wasn't as easy as the elite assumed it would be. With 
the capitalist elite increasingly focused on the Nasdaq, the high-tech business 
and markets in the rest of the world, domestic and regional "details" were 
seen as less and less important. Somehow, these details were expected to 
take care of themselves; and if they didn't - well, that was no longer a matter 
of great concern. After all, accumulation was now global, not local. 
As it turned out, however, the details hardly "fixed themselves," and were 
certainly far from unimportant. To begin with, the Israeli elite seemed to 
have confused corporate peace dividends with real peace. Its intention was 
to replicate the apartheid arrangement by making Arafat head of a "Palustan," 
a semi-autonomous entity with only half its original territories, no army, no 
fiscal and monetary sovereignty, limited access to water and complete 
dependence on Israeli infrastructure. Most importantly, it left the Jewish 
settlements intact, making the resulting Palestinian entity look like Swiss 
cheese with holes full of ethnic and religious time-bombs. If there was a 
recipe for another Intifada, this was clearly it. 
More broadly, despite its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and normalised 
relations with other neighbours, Israel remained regionally isolated - only a 
negligible proportion of its trade and investment flows were with surrounding 
countries and beyond diplomacy, there was really little cultural and intellectual 
interchange. In the absence of such secular ties, religious hostility toward 
Israel continued to build up pretty much unopposed. 
Corporate peace dividends have also aggravated domestic disparities. Over 
the past decade, Israel has become one of the less egalitarian countries in the 
industrial world. Its high-tech boom only smiled on a minority, causing the 
income ratio between the top and bottom 20% of the population to rise to 
21.3, compared to 10.6 in the US*. With unemployment approaching 10% 
and rising, it was clear that peace had failed to bring prosperity for most 
Israelis. 
Perhaps the most important detail, however, is the demographic basis of 
Zionism, which the Israeli elite allowed, almost haphazardly, to erode beyond 
reversal. Out of a total population of 6 million, 15% are now Muslims, 4% 
Christian and Druze Arabs, 15% are immigrants who arrived during the 1990s 
from the former Soviet Union (some with only remote connection to Judaism 
and most with little Zionist socialisation), and 4-6% are foreign workers 
imported in recent years to replace the Palestinians. Roughly 40% of the 
population therefore have either limited or no afJinity to the Zionist project. 
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The remaining 60% are also split by two deep cleavages - an ethnic one 
between Ashkenazi (European) and Sepharadi (Middle-Eastern) Jews, and a 
religious one between orthodox and secular Jews. The orthodox population 
is commonly poorer and although supportive of a hawkish stance against the 
Arabs, many of its members do not serve in the army. The secular segment is 
often more conciliatory, although its increasingly individualistic outlook limits 
its willingness to kill and be killed for anachronistic nationalist goals. The 
increasing individualism of this majority, however, undermines its group 
cohesion, thus making it more difficult to act in unison against the xenophobic 
minority. 
And so just as Israel's business elite become transnational, it also lost the 
domestic stability on which to base itself. At the same time, the elite lacked 
any clear ideas on what to do about it. Globalised business ties required peace, 
yet globalisation itself was contributing to the conditions that undermined 
the prospects for such peace. 
The real issue is neither Sharon nor Arafat 
When the second Palestinian Intifada broke out in October 2000, - Prime 
Minister Barak, representing an elite torn between its Zionist allegiances and 
transnational aspiration, seemed unsure as to what to do. Alarmed by the 
Palestinians loss of fear, anxious that his army may be unable to win a guerrilla 
war (let alone a fully-fledged one), and aware that conflict would shatter the 
hard-won business confidence, he hesitated, tending to respond rather than 
initiate. At the same time, his apprehension about disintegrating "Jewish" 
cohesion made it impossible for him to accept a democratic, non-ethnic 
solution to the conflict. His successor in the job, though, had no such 
hesitations. Once in power, Ariel Sharon immediately escalated both the 
rhetoric and military pressure, eventually all but re-conquering the West Bank. 
Many have attributed this shift to personality and ideology. Sharon never 
wanted peace, they pointed out. On the contrary, his plan was always to kick 
out the Palestinians in order to establish a "Greater Israel" west of the River 
Jordan, and now was his last chance to do it. 
Perhaps. But, again, there is a far bigger picture to consider here. 
When Sharon came to power, the neoliberal high-tech order was already on 
its last legs. The first signs of trouble appeared several years earlier in the 
global periphery, with excess production triggering a series of crises which 
spread from Asia in 1997, to Russia, South Africa, Brazil and the rest of the 
developing world. Then, the price of oil shot up, soaring from $10 in 1999 to 
$30 in 2000, and throwing a monkey wrench into the longest post-war 
economic expansion. The Nasdaq and other high-tech markets, having already 
reached valuation extremes, were punctured, going into a nose-dive, and in 
early 2001 a hawkish administration with deep ties to oil and armament 
interests took over the White House. In short, everything seemed ready for a 
reversal of fortunes. And indeed, as the new century took off, high-tech profits 
dropped like a stone while the earnings of oil and armament companies soared 
(Figure 1). 
Seen from this broader perspective, the escalating conflict in the Middle East 
- much like "September 11" and the attack on Afghanistan - may well be 
part of yet another global shift in accumulation. Central to this process is the 
renewed struggle between the two massive business formations. The 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition, having been in decline for more than a 
decade, is now once more trying to stir up conflict and stagflation; and so far, 
the political backwind is clearly on its side. But the jury on this contest is still 
out. The Technodollar-Mergerdollar Alliance, whose fortune rest with open- 
border neoliberalism, high-tech growth and cross-border mergers, stands to 
loose big time from such developments. And having recovered from the 
September 11 shock its representatives, both in Europe and the US, are 
beginning to voice their objection to further escalation, including Washington's 
plan to attack Iraq. 
The real issue, then, is neither Sharon nor Arafat, but the pattern of global 
accumulation. With religion winning the heart and minds of the underlying 
population, time may be running out. And if the oil and arms interests prevail, 
conflict and violence could prove devastating for Israel and the region. 
However, the neoliberal accumulators haven't given up the fight, at least not 
yet. Peace dividends require political stability, and those who wish to earn 
these dividends - in Israel and elsewhere - would need to calm things down. 
Perhaps the most effective way of achieving this goal is to remove all Israeli 
settlements from the occupied territories and establish an independent 
Palestinian state. By eliminating the main justification for continued conflict 
in the region, such a move would seriously undermine both the Petrodollar- 
Weapondollar Coalition and religious fundamentalism, opening a window 
for a more sane alternative. 
*Note that during the early 1950s, 'socialist' Israel was still one of the most 
egalitarian countries in the world, with the top 20% of the population earning 
only 3.3 times the income of the bottom 20%. This achievement was certainly 
impressive, particularly relative to the 'free market' countries such as the 
United States, where the comparable ratio was as high as 9.5. But Israel 
learned fast and after two generations of 'Americanisation' it had already 
outperformed its tutor. 
